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Japanese direct investments in the People's Republic of China (PRC) have risen in 
recent years, against the general three-year decline in their investments worldwide. 
Thus the China's share of Japanese global investments has grown substantially. In 
1992, Japan was the fourth largest investor in China. The Sino-Japanese trade is also 
enormous. In 1993, Japan has become China's largest trade partner. In this report, 
we first give some general background theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
which can help us to understand the topic under research. Then we start to study the 
economic environments in Japan and China, the Sino-Japanese trade pattern and its 
relationship to FDI. Afterwards, we narrow down to concentrate on the FDI 
environment in China. What are the Chinese government policies and the investment 
pattern? What are the incentives for foreign investors? Then we view the subject 
from the Japanese perspective. What are the Japanese global investment patterns and 
its investment strategies in the PRC? Two examples - Canon and Yaohan, are given. 
The Japanese investment approach is also compared with those of Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea. Furthermore, we try to find out what sort of problems are 
faced by the Japanese investors and how they resolve them. Last, we conclude by 
giving an outlook of FDI in China and the prospects for Japanese companies in 
China. 
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C H A P T E R I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The year 1993 marked the 20th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan. In China, there is an unprecedented boom in investment -
greater than any booms since the economic reform and open door policy have been 
launched - and due mainly to the dramatic way China has opened up to the outside 
world. In Japan, due to the strong Yen and the rise in local production costs, 
Japanese corporations have been investing overseas in order to lower their factor costs 
and upgrade their global competitive power. China wants modernization and 
industrialization, while Japan struggles to make inroads in Chinese huge market so 
as to sustain its prosperity. Since 1990, Japanese investment in China has been 
rocketing. In terms of investment amount, Japan was the fourth largest investor in 
China in 1992，just behind Hong Kong, Taiwan and the United States.丄 China 
surged from 17th (0.6% of the Japanese global investment portfolio) in 1990 to 6th 
(3.1% of the Japanese global investment portfolio) in 1992 as a Japanese investment 
1"Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates, “ JETRO China 
Newsletter, May-June 1993, p. 2. 
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site. Cumulatively, although China's share of total Japanese foreign direct investment 
(FDI) was still small (in 1992，China was Japan's 19th largest foreign investment site 
with a share of 1.2% of the Japanese global investment portfolio^), its growth rate 
was prominent. As Japanese investment in China is growing rapidly and becoming 
more and more important, it is worthwhile to have a look at its development. 
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to understand the approaches of Japanese investment in 
China. Japanese enterprises are famous for their characteristics of aggressive fast 
growing strategies. After this study, it is hoped that investors can have an overview 
of the above subject, take it as a reference, get their insights, and then make their 
own predictions or even investment decisions in China. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the approaches of Japanese FDI 
in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Specific objectives are as follows: 
(1) To study the Sino-Japanese trade pattern and its relationship to FDI; 
(2) To investigate the FDI environment in China - from the past, present to the 
future, and to see why FDI is becoming more important in China; 
(3). To identify the Japanese changing global investment pattern by geographical 
2 " 平 成 4 年 度 封 外 及 對 內 直 接 投 資 狀 況 , 〃 大 藏 省 0 
際金融局， ["Japanese Foreign Direct Investment and FDI in Japan in 1992," 
Ministry of Finance, Japan,] 3 June 1993，p. 2. 
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areas and industries; 
(4) To analyze the Japanese past and current investment strategies in China, and 
to examine why the role of Japanese investment is becoming more significant; 
(5) To evaluate the importance of China in the Japanese global investment 
strategies and the impact of Japanese investment in China to the Japanese 
economy itself; 
(6) To find out what are the problems faced by Japanese direct investors in China; 
(7) To project the trend and future direction of Japanese investment in China. 
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C H A P T E R II 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This is an exploratory research to understand the approaches of Japanese investment 
in China and to examine the experience and problems faced by those Japanese 
companies. The trading and investment data of the past five to ten years would be 
assembled and consolidated. Views and opinions from different reports would also 
be integrated, analyzed and commented. Conclusions would be made to project the 
future directions of Japanese investment in the PRC. 
2.2 TOPIC DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can be defined as the control of a company in one 
country by an organization based in another country. The amount of ownership share 
necessary for control is not clear-cut but depends on agreement between the investing 
parties. 
Japanese Investment in the PRC ； £ 
The People's Republic of China (PRC) refers to the mainland China founded in 1949 
and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, excluding Hong Kong and Taiwan. This 
report uses the word "China" as a synonym for the PRC. 
When doing the analysis, we assume that the China's open door policy would 
continue. It is because any political fluctuation would have significant changes to the 
investment environment. 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The information and statistical data mainly come from secondary sources. An 
extensive literature review would be conducted. Information is collected from: 
(1) various business and management journals from the systems Business 
Periodicals Ondisc (BPO) and ABI/Inform database in different university 
libraries; 乂 
(2) current newspaper clippings; 
(3) various statistical reports from China in the Universities Service Centre; 
(4) related survey reports; and 
(5) direct contact with appropriate trade development agencies such as Japan 
External Trade Organization (JETRO), Hong Kong. 
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2.4 TREATMENT OF THE DATA 
The statistical data collected would be analyzed in order to find out the Japanese 
investment patterns and strategies in China. These would be matched against the 
Chinese FDI policies and compared with other investing countries' approaches. Then 
the trends and future directions would be projected. Some current issues, problems 
and views from different trade executives and scholars would also be discussed. 
J 
2.5 LIMITATIONS AND OBSTACLES 
There are some practical limitations and obstacles on this research: 
(1) Some information and data from different sources are conflicting. In 
particular, Mr. Richard Hornik - Time magazine's Beijing bureau chief (1985-
87) and Southeast Asia bureau chief (1991-93)，blames many of today's 
bullish forecasts about China's economic futilre use inaccurate Chinese official 
statistics without a blush. Any investor who takes the statistics into account 
would certainly want far higher returns to offset the risks.� To resolve the 
problem, we have to evaluate the varying authenticity of the sources, to 
examine them in the light of the environments, the social, business, or 
political climate, or other socioeconomic backgrounds from which they 
emerge. 
^Richard Hornik, "Lies, Damn Lies and Chinese Statistics," The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, January 25, 1994，p. 6. 
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(2) Some statistics are not up-to-date or even in different bases. In addition, the 
definitions of terms could vary in different articles. Also the information is 
available in three languages - English, Chinese and Japanese. We have to 
search many different sources to update the information and make a lot of 
effort to convert the statistics and terms to a common basis for comparison; 
(3) The environment and policies in China are changing with time frequently. 
The collected data might become outdated with such moving target. We have 
to update the data constantly to keep them current. 
(4) We have to make allowances for the personal bias of different research 
reporters. 
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C H A P T E R III 
G E N E R A L B A C K G R O U N D T H E O R I E S O F FDI 
The following gives some of the general background theories of FDI. Although it 
may not be comprehensive, it does help us to identify the patterns and factors in the 
practical world more easily. 
In terms of geographical area, investment can be classified into two forms: (1) Gross 
Domestic Investment; and (2) Foreign Investment. Foreign Investment can further 
be subdivided into two types: (1) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); and (2) Foreign 
Portfolio Investment (FPI). The factor that distinguishes direct from portfolio 
investment is that control must follow direct investment, while portfolio investment 
is used primarily for financial purposes only/ FDI can be carried out in the forms 
of (1) Equity Joint Ventures, (2) Contractual Joint Ventures, (3) Wholly Foreign 
Owned Companies or, (4) Joint Exploration.^ These are collectively called Foreign-
Funded Enterprises (FFEs) in this report. 
4Joseph Battat, "Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing Trends," 
East Asian Executive Reports, August 15，1991，p. 15. 
^"Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92, “ JETRO China Newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 
1993, p. 19. 
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Equity Joint Ventures are limited liability companies whose profit distribution is 
determined by the equity contributions of the various parties, while for Contractual 
Joint Ventures, the rights and liabilities of various parties' share are set out in a 
contract, as well as' each party's share of goods produced and profit generated. 
Normally, contractual joint venture lasts for 10 to 30 years with a possible extension 
to 50 years. Wholly Foreign Owned Companies are wholly owned by foreign 
companies. In terms of operation, FFEs could also be classified into (1) processing 
J 
and assembly agreement, and (2) compensation type. For processing and assembly 
agreement, usually the China side would provide factory premises, power and labour, 
while the foreign party supplies raw materials or knock-down parts. Finished goods, 
after paying a processing fee to China parties, will go to the foreign party for sale in 
its own market. This is a very common form of Hong Kong investors who have 
shifted much of their production in the early 1980s. For compensation type, foreign 
investors provide a combination of services, equipment, training and technological 
know-how. In return, the foreign party can receive return payment over a period of 
two to five years. This is also called the "product buy-back" trade.^ 
Foreign Direct Investment and Merchandise Trade are the two most important forms 
of foreign business activities. They are closely related. Intuitively, FDI is regarded 
as a substitute for exports. However, this may not be the case. On the contrary, FDI 
often stimulates trade movement due to a need for domestic operating units to ship 
materials and components to their foreign facilities for use in a finished product. The 
^W. K. Anthony Wong et al, A Profile of The People's Republic of China，March 
1993, p. 7. 
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finished products could also be shipped back to the investing countries. 
Two main reasons that firms engage in FDI instead of merely export are: (1) to 
expand markets; and (2) to acquire supplies or resources.? 
For market-expansion investments, they may be motivated by the followings: 
(1) Transportation increases cost so much that it becomes impractical to export 
some products; 
(2) Some products are perishable such as food; 
(3) The cost for further local expansion is too high. This may be due to that the 
domestic production capacity is saturated or the local currency value is too 
high, which rises the factor cost too much, and in turn affects the firm's 
global competitiveness. This is particularly true when the technology is of 
small-scale process; 
(4) Imports are highly restricted; and 
(5) Consumers prefer domestically made products because of nationalism or after-
sales services. 
For resource-seeking investments, they may be motivated by the folio wings: 
(1) Vertical integration is needed to secure production; 
(2) Rationalized production is adopted to produce different components or 
different products in different countries in order to take advantages of different 
factor cost; 
(3) Firms want to gain better access to production factors; and 
^The theories are partially adapted from - John D. Daniels and Lee H. 
Radegaugh, International Business Environments and Operations (Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley, 1992)，pp. 12，210-222. 
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(4) Govermnents give political incentives to direct investors to gain advantages 
over other countries. 
Many investments are made because of interrelated multiple motives. 
FDI can be carried out in two forms - by acquiring an interest in an existing operation 
or by constructing new facilities. The advantages of acquiring include (1) avoidance 
of start-up problems; (2) an easier financing situation; and (3) not adding capacity in 
existing market. The advantages of constructing new facilities include (1) no carry-
over of past problems; and (2) no need to analyze and find a desirable firm. 
72 
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C H A P T E R I V 
S I N O - J A P A N E S E E N V I R O N M E N T AND T R A D E P A T T E R N 
J 
4.1 JAPAN'S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
In the Second World War, Japan's industrial facilities were largely destroyed. 
However, its economy recovered quickly by applying the outward-oriented 
development strategies, having a superior performance in export, economic 
development, and employment. Investment was also huge. In the last five years of 
1980s, Japanese investment accounted for 35.6% of its GDP while the United States 
was investing 17%, Such a high ratio of investirient to GDP and the adoption of 
efficient industrial techniques resulted in strong real growth rates, particularly in the 
1960s helped by high standards of education, good labour-management relations and 
government guidance for selected industries. Japan thus emerged as one of the 
world's economic superpower. However, the Japan's economy has been not so good 
recently. Table 4.1 illustrates several Japan's economic indicators. 
^Lester Thurow, Head to Head - The coming Economic Battle among Japan, 
Europe, an America (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing Limited, 1993), p. 127. 
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Table 4.1 
Japan's Economic Indicators 
(* Forecast values) 
“ 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GDP (US$ bil.) • 2.407 2,897 2,869 2,925 3,341 
Population (mil.) 122.2 122.7 123.2 123.6 1 2 4 . 0 _ _ ^ 
GDP per head ($ '000) ~ 19.69 23.60 23.29 23.67 26.94 29.34 
Real GDP growth (%) 4.1 6.2 4.7 4.8 4.3 IA__ 
Inflation (%) ^ ^ _ _ i L ！：^  ！H^ 
Exchange rate ¥:$ 144.6 128.2 138.0 145.0 135.0 127.0 
Trade balance ($ bil.) 96.4 | 95.0 76.9 | 63.5 | 103.0 | 132.3 
“ 1993 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998* 
" ^ ( U S $ bil.) 4.225 4,326 4,670 5,108 5,552 5,916 
Population (mil.) “ 124.8 125,2 125.6 125.9 126.3 126J 
" ^ p e r head ($ ’000) 一 33.85 34.55 37.19 40.56 43.959 46.712 
Real GDP growth (%) 0.0 0.5 2.0 3.1 2.9 
Inflation (%) 1-2 0.6 0丄 0丄 2_3 L^ 
Exchange rate ¥:$ 111.0 110.0 劃 100.0 97.0 95.0 
" ^ b a l a n c e ($ bil.) 141.0 115.5 107.3 91A 饥 9 82.3 
Source: Japan - EIU Country Forecast 1st quarter 1994 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Limited, 1994)，pp. 20-21. 
From the table, we can see that the real economic growth in 1993 was 0% • The huge 
trade surplus rose to US$141 billion. The yen became too strong. In fact Japan's 
recession began three years ago with the collapse of stock and land prices, that is, 
what we call the "collapse of the bubble economy". To deal with the recession, 
Japanese government introduced several measures, which included (1) bringing 
forward public works spending, (2) implementing measures to lower the investment 
tax burden, (3) using government fiscal investment and loan programmes to help 
14 ‘ 
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small- and medium-sized companies weather the slow-down, and (4) improving the 
quality of life through fiscal steps.^ Recently, Mr Hosakawa (the former Japanese 
Prime Minister) has planned an economic stimulus package - a six trillion yen income 
tax cut, combined with a controversial 7% "national welfare tax", and another 10 
trillion yen or so in public spending.i�Nevertheless, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU) forecasts the Japanese economic growth is gloomy and will not begin to 
recover strongly until 1995 (refer to table 4.1). In the short term, business 
confidence will remain low, reflecting weak financial markets, the strength of the yen 
and sluggish growth in private consumption. 
Critic says that the age of expansion of the Japanese economy is coming to an end. 
It is now moving into a new era where the Japanese businessmen should emphasize 
on maintaining stability. Foreign direct investment is a way out that can sustain 
Japan's economic growth to a certain extent. Is there a market with the potential for 
growth which can buy the massive production facilities and other complex products? 
If yes, where is it? Casting an eye over the various world markets with this question 
in mind, it becomes apparent that the Chinese market can probably support the 
Japanese economy and ensure its future prosperity. That is a major reason for Japan 
to invest in China. 
9K. John Fukuda, Japanese Management in East Asia and Beyond (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1993), pp. 21,22. 
10Alan Reynolds, "A Taxing Solution to Japan's Recession，" The Asian Wall 
Street Journal, February 4-5, 1994, p. 8. 
25 
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4.2 CHINA'S ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 by the Chinese Communist 
Party. In 1976, Mao Zedong died, and his widow and her cohorts (the so-called 
Gang of Four) were arrested. Deng Xiaoping has become the 'paramount' political 
figure since 1977. In 1978，the Party line was redirected by Deng from class struggle 
to the road of socialist four modernizations, namely, agriculture, industry, national 
defence and technology. In 1979, the country started the "open door" policy. 
After that, the Chinese economy experienced three booms. The first boom was in 
1985. The government then turned to a policy of retrenchment. The 1988 boom 
ended with the June 4th Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. In 1992, with Deng 
Xiaoping's "grand tour of the South" and the subsequent decision of the 14th Party 
National Congress in October to shift to a "socialist market economy" (meaning an 
economy based on public ownership, but run along market economic principles), the 
Chinese have come out with the basic policies for drastically changing the way the 
economy is run. Great progress has been shown in the policy of economic 
liberalization in particular. However, the economy became overheated again. In 
May 1993, financial austerity measures were taken to cool the economy. Interest 
rates on bank deposits were raised twice, in May and July. Therefore, the key 
economic issue always facing China's leadership is how to liberalise the economy 
further without sparking an inflationary spiral and another period of overheating that 
causes shortages of raw materials and infrastructure problems. 
Japanese Investment in the PRC -
Table 4.2 
China's Economic Indicators 
f* Forecast values) 
, 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GNP (US$ bil.) , 303.6 378.0 424.8 369.9 380.1 435.9 
Population (bil.) 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.17 
GNP per head ($) 281 343 378 327 329 372 
Real GNP growth (%) 10.9 11.3 4.3 4.0 1.1 13.0 
Urban inflation (%) 9.1 21.4 17.6 , 3.7 7.7 8.6 
Exchange rate Rmb:$ 3.72 3.72 >. 3.77 4.78 5.32 5.51 
Trade balance ($ bil.) -1.7 -5.3 -5.6 9.2 5.2 
1993 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998* 
GNP (US$ bil.) 528.5 449.1 498.1 560.5 629.1 708A 
Population (bil.) 1.19 1.21 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.28 
GNP per head ($) 444 372 407 451 499 554 
Real GNP growth (%) 13.0 9�0 8.8 8.6 7.9 8.0 
Urban inflation (%) 20.0 16.0 9.0 12.0 10.0 10.0 
Exchange rate Rmb:$ 5.83 8.80 9.50 10.00 10.40 10.60 
Trade balance ($ bil.) -7.8 -10.5 ^.9 -8.5 -7.2 -5.6 
Source: China - EIU Country Forecast 1st quarter 1994 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
Limited, 1994)，pp. 18，19. 
Table 4.2 illustrates several China's economic indicators. China's countrywide 
inflation in 1993 was 13%. The urban inflation was as high as 20%. The GNP 
growth was 13 %. Concerning the exchange rate, on December 29, 1993, the Chinese 
government announced the official exchange rate and the exchange rate prevailing at 
the 18 foreign currency swap centres to be unified on January 1，1994. The Foreign 
Exchange Certificates (FECs) was going to be phased out. The value of the 
Renminbi (Rmb) against other currencies is no longer officially set by the 
77 
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government, but results from the interplay of market forces with government 
intervention in the currency market. At the end of December 1993, the official rate 
stood at Rmb5.8:US$l, while the swap rate was approximately Rmb8.7:US$l. The 
unification of the two rates at the swap rate effectively devaluated the official rate by 
50% For economic forecast, the political bureau of the Communist Party has issued 
targets for 1994 which expects to slow down the countrywide inflation rate at below 
10% and economic growth at 9%. Policies such as tight control on the issue of new 
J 
money and on government spending are adopted. China also issued bonds to cover 
its budget deficit instead of printing new money, and invested more in agriculture to 
improve supplies and reduce increases in food prices." For instance, on February 
3，1994，China has successfully launched a US$1 billion global bond issue rated at 
A-minus by Fitch Investor Services. The 1994 Treasury bond issue has also been 
enlarged to a total of RmblOO billion. 12 
4.3 SINO-JAPANESE TRADE'PATTERN 
According to the reports from the Customs General Administration, China's total 
export and import in 1993 reached a value of US$195.72 billion, accounting for 
almost 40% of China's GNP. Imports rose 29% in 1993 to US$103.95 billion, while 
11 "China's Central Bank Chief Says Inflation Will Decline in 1994，1995," The 
Asian Wall Street Journal, March 7，1994, p. 4. 
China - EIU Country Forecast 1st quarter 1994 (London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit Limited, 1994)，p. 9. 
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exports rose 8% to US$91.77 billion.^^ As shown in table 4.3，the position of 
foreign funded enterprises (FFEs) in China's foreign trade has been further 
strengthened. Its percentage in the total imports and exports increased from 26.3% 
in 1992 to 34.3% in 1993. In other words, the increase in FDI could actually pop 
up the trade figures to a large extent. It was because many FFEs were of processing 
and assembly type. They imported their equipment during establishing periods. 
After processing and assembling parts, they exported the majority of the finished 
products. Therefore, there was a steady growth in imports and exports of FFEs along 
with the increase in investment in China. Products of FFEs with high export ratios 
included electronic products, textile products and apparel, and footwear. 
Table 4.3 
Trade of Foreign Funded Enterprises (FFEs) in China, 1993 
(Unit: US$ bil.) 
Amount % A over 1992 % of China's total foreign trade 
Exports by FFEs 25.24 45.5 21.5 
Imports by FFEs 41.83 58.6 似 
Total by FFEs 67.07 53.3 | 34.3 | 
Source: "China's Foreign Trade in 1993 over US$195B," China Economic News, February 21，1994， 
p. 12. 
In 1993，trade between Japan and China reached US$39.04 billion, up 53.9% over 
1992.14 Exports to Japan was US$15.79 billion while imports was US$23.25 
i3"Chiiia Says Trade Balance Swung to a Deficit in '93," The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, January 10，1994，p. 3. 
i4"China，s Foreign Trade in 1993 over US$195B," China Economic News, 
February 21，1994, pp. 11-13. 
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billion. 15 According to the Chinese Vice-Premier and Central Bank Chief Zliu 
Rongji, the total trade figure could have a ten-fold increase up to US$390 billion 
within ten years.^^ Among Japan's trade partners, China remained in second place 
after the U.S. in term§' of imports, but rose from eighth to sixth place as a target for 
exports. In terms of total trade, China rose from 1992，s fifth place to second place 
in 1993，pulling ahead of Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea. Today, China is 
Japan's second largest trade partner, just behind the U.S., while Japan has replaced 
Hong Kong as China's largest trade partner. Table 4.4 shows the China's largest 
trade partner in 1993 and table 4.5 shows the trade figures between Japan and China 




"China Says Japan Top Trading Partner," The Asian Wall Street Journal, 
January 18，1994，p. 3. 
I6 〃中日十年內雙邊貿易，朱鎔基料可增長十倍，〃明報， [Zu 
Rongji expects trade between China and Japan could have a ten-fold increase within 
ten years," Ming Pao’] February 26，1994，p. A9. 
• , -t 
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Table 4.4 
China's Largest Trade Partners in 1993 
(Unit: US$ mil.) 
Region Trade Amount 
•"； 39.04 
Japan 
~ “ — 32.54 
Hong Kong 
United States 27.65 
EEC (including Germany US$10 billion) 饭丄。 
~ “ - 14.39 
Taiwan 
Economic Alliance of Southeast Asia 
Republic of Korea 8-22 
7 
Russian Federation ‘ 




Japan-China Trade, 1987 to 1993 
(Unit: US$ mil.) 
Year Exports to % A Imports from % A Total % A Balance 
China China 
8,250 -16.3 7,401 30.9 15,651 0.9 848 
9,476 14.9 9,859 33.2 19,335 23.5 -383 
8,516 -10.1 11,146 13.1 19,662 1.7 -2 ,630 
^ 6，129 -28.0 12,054 8.1 18,183 -7.5 -5,924 
8,593 40.2 14,216 17.9 22,809 25.4 -5,623 
1992 11,949 30.1 16,953 19.3 28,902 26.7 -5,004 
17,270 44.5 20,560 21.3 37,830 30.9 -3,290 
Source: "China now Japan's second largest trade partner, “ JETRO China Newsletter, Sept.-Oct. 1993’ 
p. 21. 
"Japan-China ties warm amid tensions with U.S.," The Asian Wall Street Journal, March 21， 
1994’ pp. 1,10. 
It should be noted that the figures of most China's major trading partners differ 
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greatly from official Chinese figures. For instance, in 1993，China's export to Japan 
was US$15.79 billion while Japan recorded an import of US$20.56 billion! Import 
from Japan was US$23,25 billion while Japan's export was only US$17.27 billion! 
Both parties claimed to have a trade deficit (China claimed a deficit of US$7.46 
billion while Japan claimed a deficit of US$3.29 billion) because both wanted the 
counter-parties to buy more of their own goods. One reason accounted for such 
discrepancy was that China excluded trade that passed through Hong Kong, treating 
such trade as being with Hong Kong only, while other countries judge imports by 
country of origin. However, according to Dr. Friedrich Wu - vice president and head 
of economic research at the Development Bank of Singapore, who examined "errors 
and omissions" in China's balance of payments nearby, and found evidence of US$8 
billion disappearing in 1992. He suspected that enough money leaked out through 
phony import and export invoices.口 Although the figures were conflicting, both 
sides showed the increasing trend for bilateral trade. Such increase can be accounted 
for as follows: 
The reasons behind the increase in exports to China were: (1) the growth in domestic 
Chinese demand (13% growth in real GNP in 1993); (2) the start of large-scale 
projects under the eighth five-year plan (1991-1995)，and the increase in contracts for 
plant exports to China; (3) the surge in investment in China in 1993，which led to an 
increase in imports by Japanese affiliates in China for machinery, equipment, and 
materials. 
i 7 F r i e d r i c h Wu, "China's Rising Speculative Outflows," The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, March 7，1994, p. 6. 
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The reasons behind the increase in imports from China were: (1) the increase in 
reverse imports from Japanese affiliates in China and consignment processing deals; 
(2) the shift in production bases from the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies 
(NIEs) - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, to China. 
Below we try to break down the Sino-Japanese exports and imports by commodity. 
As mentioned before, the surge in FDI in China brings a large demand for machinery 
and equipment. Table 4.6 shows machinery and equipment accounted for 57.5% of 
Japan's exports to China in the first half of 1993，rising 67.4% compared with the 
previous year. Passenger cars (within the transport equipment category), in 
particular, rose by 711.8% (volume basis, 22,700 cars, January - May，1993). 
Facsimile machines (within the electrical machinery category) rose by a remarkable 
515.8%. Steel rod for building construction (within the metal articles category) rose 
spectacularly by 1,639% (408,293 tons, January - May, 1993)，which meant Chinese 
steel producers were unable to meet the domestic demand and has had to rely on 
imports. 
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Table 4.6 
Japan's Exports to China, by Commodity (First Half 1993) 
(Unit: US$ mil.; MT = metric tons) 
Commodity Unit Quantity Value % of overall 
export 
1. Foodstuffs - - 12.8 
2. Raw Materials - - 186.3 2A 
3. Mineral Fuels - 103.6 1-3 
4. Industrial Products - - 7,451.0 95.2 
Chemical products - _ 491.5 6.3 
Machinery and mechanical apparatus - - 4,499.0 57.5 
General machinery - - 2,011.7 25.7 
Electrical machinery - - 1,119.9 15.1 
Transport equipment - - 1,100.6 14.1 
Precision instruments - _ 206.8 2.6 
Textile articles MT 27,323 508.5 6.5 
Metal articles 1,000 MT 3,391 1,604.5 20.5 
Total Exports - - 7,826.7 100-0 
Source: "Japan's Exports to China, by commodity, “ JETRO China Newsletter, Sept.-Oct. 1993, p. 23. 
Concerning the Japan's imports from China, table 4.7 shows industrial products 
accounted for a 61.5% share of Japan's total imports from China in the first half of 
1993. "Textile articles" was the traditional leading group because of its relative low 
price. Oil (within the mineral fuels category) is one of China's main sources of 
foreign currency, so China is making efforts to export it, but ironically, the domestic 
energy supply and demand situation is becoming pinched because of the insufficient 
infrastructure. 
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Table 4.7 
Japan's Imports from China, by Commodity (First Half 1993) 
(Unit: US$ mil.; MT 二 metric tons) 
Commodity U ^ Quantity Value % of overall 
export 
1. Foodstuffs — - - 1 肌7 16.3 
2. Raw Materials ： ' 713.9 8.1 
3. Mineral Fuels — -一 • 丄 扉 13.7 
4. Industrial Products - _ 5,398.4 6 ” 
Chemical products " _ 355.6 ^ . l 
Machinery and mechanical apparatus - - 774.8 Q-Q 
Textile articles MT 225,271 2,649.6 30.2 
Metal articles 1,000 MT 135 173.9 2.0 
Processed monument & building stone MT 161,941 76.5 
Leather articles (ex. trunks and bags) MT 2,640 32.0 0.4 
Miscellaneous articles _ 1,112.1 l^A 
Total Imports - | - | 8,771.3 | 100.0 
Source: "Japan's Exports to China, by commodity, “ JETRO China Newsletter, Sept.-Oct. 1993, p. 24. 
When talking about Japanese trade, we cannot stop mentioning the Japan's trading 
companies - sogo shosha. They are the cornerstone of Sino-Japanese trade. The top-
five trading companies - Itohchu, Marubeni, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo -
accounted for 50-60% of the bilateral trade between China and Japan. They dominate 
in the trading of oil, coal, steel and foodstuffs. Each company has more than a dozen 
joint ventures in China. 
For prediction about the trend of Sino-Japanese trade, Japan's exports to China should 
continue to be strong. While there are negative factors such as: (1) the delays in 
opening of letters of credit due to the shortage of foreign currency in China; (2) the 
possibility of the postponement or cancellation of projects due to the fiscal belt-
tightening and resultant shortage of funds in China, there are positive factors such as: 
\ 
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(1) the continued high level of economic growth and domestic demand in China; (2) 
the continued demand for capital goods and production goods for projects under the 
eighth five-year plan. Japan's imports from China should also increase steadily 
despite the slow pace of recovery of the Japanese economy due to: (1) the direct 
investments of Japanese companies in China and consignment processing and the 
increased number of new projects; (2) the continued increase in investment by Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries in China and the consequent shift 
of imports from the Asian NIEs to imports from China; and (3) the continued 
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C H A P T E R V 
T H E FDI E N V I R O N M E N T IN T H E P R C 
Here we address the historical development, policies, patterns and incentives for FDI 
in China. 
5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF FDI IN CHINA 
Figure 5.1 shows the trends in direct investment in China. The data are also 
tabulated in table 5.1. Up to now, China's FDI development can be identified into 
six stages: 
First is the starting stage. In 1979, the country started the policy of opening up its 
economy. The government emphasized creating a basic legal framework and 
developing a few special economic zones. However, its domestic economy was still 
recovering from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, only a limited amount of FDI 
was attracted. 
Second is the first booming stage. From 1983 to 1985, FDI approval criteria and 
administrative procedures were developed. Foreign investors were given access to 
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the domestic market and to local financing. Fourteen 'open cities', covering the 
coastal areas, were added to the original four Special Economic Zones [SEZs] as 
locations with favourable conditions for FDI. As a result, foreign investment surged. 
Appendix 1 summarizes the development of the priority investment areas in China 
from 1979 to 1994. 
Figure 5.1 
Trends in Direct Investment in China (Contract Basis) 
9 0 0 0 0 -j 1 2 0 
：：: :。 
{-。 臺 3 0 i 
1 
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Table 5.1 
Trends in Direct Investment in China (Contract Basis) 
(Unit: US$ bil.) 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
No. of projects 1856 3073 1498 3073 5945 5779 7273 12978 48764 83265— 
Contract value 2.65 5.93 2.83 3.71 5.30 5.6 6.60 11.98 58.12 110.85 
T n y ^ e n t e d v 补记 1.26 1.66 1.87 2.31 3.20 3.39 3.49 4.37 11.00 25.75 
Utilization rate (%) 47.5 28.0 66.1 62.4 60.3 60.6 52.9 36.4 18.9 23.2 
Source: "Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates, “ JETRO China Newsletter, May-June 1993，p. 2. 
"Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92," ibid., Jan.-Feb. 1993，p.l6. 
Joseph Battat, "Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing Trends," East Asian Executive Reports, August 
15， 1991， p. 12. 
"Foreign Investment Soared in China in '93," The Asian Wall Street Journal, February 2，1994，p.3. 
Third is the retrenching stage. From 1986 to 1987, however, faced with rising 
inflation and other economic problems at home, the government turned to a policy of 
retrenchment. More restrictions were imposed on foreign investors' access to local 
financing and foreign exchange. The overall growth of FDI was thus slowed. As 
shown in table 5.1，the contract value dropped from US$5.93 billion in 1985 to 
US$2.83 billion in 1986. This led to a sharp rise in utilization rate from 28% to 
66.1%. 
Fourth is the second booming stage. In the spring of 1988, a call for development 
of the 'Golden Coast' once again spurred domestic reform and FDI utilization. 
Unlike previous efforts for development and reform, less emphasis was put on high-
technology and more on export-oriented projects. Another FDI boom resulted. 
Fifth is the stagnant stage. Economic problems and an austerity program had 
curtailed foreign investment in China even before the June 4th Tiananmen Square 
\ 
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incident in 1989. Since 1989，authorities have adopted new, stricter project approval 
criteria that reemphasized high-technology and export-oriented production. 
Sixth is the third booming stage. In 1992, aided by the "grand tour" of the South by 
Deng Xiaoping, local governments throughout China began actively soliciting 
investment from foreign companies. China thus experienced its third foreign 
investment boom after the previous two boom years of 1985 and 1988. Table 5.1 
shows that in 1993, China received 83,265 investments, up 71% from the previous 
year and worth US$110.85 billion, up 91%.'^ During the 12-month period, China 
received a record-breaking amount of investment, comparable with the cumulative 
total in the 14 years from 1979 to 1992. By the end of September 1993, China have 
cumulatively approved the establishment of 153,580 FFEs with a total contracted 
foreign investment of US$192.96 billion, in which US$49.56 billion have actually 
been put in.^^ The increase reflected both foreign companies' enthusiasm for 
business opportunities in China, and the Chinese government's willingness to grant 
them greater access to the domestic market. Although the infrastructural projects are 
always the largest individual ones in China, the manufacturing projects still dominate 
in terms of aggregate investment amount. Appendix 2 shows the China's top ten 
FFES (Manufacturing) in 1992. Note that Shanghai Volkswagen, Beijing Jeep and 
Guangzhou Peugeot are all auto makers in China. 
i8”Foreigii Investment Soared in China in，93，" The Asian Wall Street Journal’ 
February 2, 1994，p. 3. 
i9"China，s Biggest 500 FFEs (Productive) in 1992，" China Economic News, 
December 13, 1993, p. 1. 
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Now, the situation is fluctuating. In May 1993, the Chinese came out with a fiscal 
belt-tightening policy to cool down the overheated economy. FDI was restricted. In 
November 1993, the rules were loosened and FDI boomed again. In the early 1994, 
the State Council tightened controls on construction, bank lending, the opening of 
development zones and the issuance of commercial stocks and bonds outside the 
government plan, in an attempt to wrestle inflation down from the dangerous level it 
reached in 1993. New fixed capital investment projects are forbidden.^^ However, 
many investors are now well-accustomed to ignoring government instructions and no 
longer under the government control. 
Analyzing the figures in table 5.1, there are still some negative implications: (1) the 
average investment amount was around US$1.3 million, which means that China still 
has to make effort to attract the large projects it wants; (2) the actual foreign 
investment did not grow consistently with the amount approved, with an unimpressive 
low utilization rate of 23.2% in 1993; (3) the FDI in China normally accounts for 
only several percents of China's total investment. For instance, in 1989, the gross 
domestic investment in China was US$152 billion while FDI inflow was only US$3.4 
billion - a mere 2.2% of China's total investment.^^ 
2o"China Bans New Investment Plans In Renewed Bid to Fight Inflation," The 
Asian Wall Street Journal, February 1，1994，p. 4. 
21 Joseph Battat, "Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing Trends," 
East Asian Executive Reports, August 15, 1991, p. 15. 
\ 
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5.2 RECENT POLICIES FOR FDI IN CHINA 
Recent policies for opening up China have been oriented in several directions: 
First, there is the easing of restrictions on foreign investment in tertiary industry 
fields such as wholesaling and retailing, transportation, communications, trading, 
management consulting, insurance, real estate and finance. The most striking growth 
is in the real estate industry. Its development is so fast that which causes the 
economy of China to be overheated. Example is Hong Kong's Sun Hung Kai Real 
Estate in Beijing's Wangfujing. For retailing and trading, large shopping centres are 
also constructed. Example is the joint venture of Yaohan Co. and Shanghai Number 
One department store in the Shanghai Pudong district. 
Second, moves are being made to gradually open up the domestic market. 
Meanwhile, the "administrative guidance" exercised to determine the export ratios of 
FFEs is being relaxed in the high-tech fields and inland areas. As a result, Motorola 
subsidiary producing cellular phones in Tianjin has obtained approval for domestic 
sale of 30% of its production, despite being a wholly foreign owned operation, due 
to the advanced technology and large scale of the project. 
Third, in terms of China's regional development policy, great strides are being made 
in opening up all regions (not only coastal regions) economically. The Chinese 
government has developed geographical areas where foreigners may invest such as 
opening up the lower and middle reaches of the Changjiang river from the Pudong 
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district of Shanghai all the way up to Chongqing, opening up the border regions in 
both North and South. By providing the same incentives for foreign investment as 
in the coastal cities, it is hoped that foreign investment will extend into the inland 
areas as well. 
Fourth, there has also been a shift from management of foreign investment by region 
as in the past to management by industry gradually. Right now, China has already 
developed a large number of open economic zones, the five Special Economic Zones 
[SEZs]，the 14 economic and technical development zones and the Shanghai Pudong 
district. At this stage, at the central government level, foreign investment is closely 
tied to industrial policy. Policies for its introduction are being clearly set down for 
each industry and concrete steps are being taken to encourage it, including steps in 
the spheres of tax and law. For example, in the area of retail business, the 
government allows investments of two to three companies in 11 regions (Beijing， 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qingdao, Guangzhou, and the five SEZs) and permits up 
to 30% of the products sold to be foreign products. 
Fifth, the central government is also delegating more authority to the municipalities, 
counties and towns. There has been an increase in independent economic zones and 
mini-industrial estates established by county governments in the suburbs of the cities. 
Sixth, high marks have also been given to China for its on-going reevaluation of 
previously promulgated foreign investment related laws and regulations as the 
situation in China changes. For example, regulation of fiscal management and the 
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accounting system for FFEs were revised and supplemented in June and July of 1992. 
The amendments made to the joint venture law in April 1990 allow ventures to extend 
their contract periods easily. In addition, the various internal regulations which 
caused so much trouble in investments are now being abolished in stages. A 50-year 
usage right is permitted. China is also moving to permit secondary businesses of 
FFES and the establishment of stock-holding companies. 
5.3 DIRECT INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN CHINA 
Due to the above policies, we could identify several trends: (1) in terms of sizes, the 
average contract value of projects grew in size; (2) in terms of investing country and 
region, investment from Asia, primarily the NIEs and Japan, is soaring; (3) in terms 
of Chinese regions being invested, coastal regions still dominate but foreign 
investment is now reaching into the inland areas. Below shows the details of the FDI 
patterns in China. 
A breakdown by type of investment reveals a surge in equity joint ventures as shown 
in table 5.2. It might be due to (1) the large Chinese market with the result that the 
merits of joint ventures, which are allowed to sell a portion of their production on the 
domestic market, were reevaluated; and (2) the fact that there was a succession of 
large joint venture projects restarted. Cumulatively, by the end of September 1992, 
equity joint ventures were most important in terms of both number and value, 
accounting for 63% of the total number of projects. The project sizes were also 
growing. There was a striking increase in large scale strategic projects such as power 
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Stations, railways, highways, and other infrastructure projects, as well as 
petrochemicals, land development and aircraft industry. Up to now, the largest equity 
joint venture in China is the Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint Venture Company Ltd 
(GNPJVC) at Daya Bay. It was formed on January 24，1985 by the Guangdong 
Nuclear Investment Company Ltd (GNIC) and the Hong Kong Nuclear Investment 
Company Ltd (HKNIC), a wholly owned subsidiary of China Light & Power Co. Ltd 
(CLP) of Hong Kong. The power plant has two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) 
of the 900 megawatt (MW) class. The total investment for the project is HK$28.7 
billion (US$3.7 bill ion^. 
Table 5.2 
Direct Investment in China, by Type (Contract Basis) 
(Unit: US$ bil.) 
Type 1990 1991 Cumulative as of 
End of Sept. 1992 
No. Value No. Value No. Value 
Total direct foreign investment 7,273 6.60 12,978 11.98 69,886 82.94 
Equity Joint ventures 4,091 2.70 8,395 6.08 43,798 35.91 
" ^ r a c t u a l joint ventures 1,317 1.25 1,778 2.14 14,570 24.90 
Wholly foreign owned companies 1,860 _ll!2L. _ i H L 
Joint exploration 5 0.19 | 10 0.09 | 81 | 3.96 
Source: "Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92," JETRO China Newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 1993, p. 19. 
"Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates," ibid., May-June 1993, p. 
4. 
Some facts about Daya Bay (Hong Kong: Guangdong Nuclear Power Joint 
Venture Co. Ltd, August 1989). 
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The law and legislation for equity joint ventures are rather complex. To illustrate just 
a bit, appendix 3 shows the general rules and requirement for the setting up of a joint 
venture business in China. In view of the regulation, the Chinese govenunent indeed 
offer much freedom and confidence to the foreign investors. But still, there may have 
some restraint and some interference by the government, such as the need for 
approval of state authorities and administration for the industry and commerce for 
terminating business. For the detail about the law and regulation for a joint venture, 
it was stipulated in the "Regulation for the Implementation of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Joint Ventures using Chinese and Foreign Investment" 
(promulgated by the State Council on September 20，1983). 
Besides equity joint ventures, in recent years, however, there has also been an 
increase in investment in wholly foreign owned companies. Cumulative figures as 
of the end of September 1992 show these accounted for 16% of the number of 
projects or 22% of their value. The reasons for such increase were (1) the 
implementation of the Foreign Capital Enterprise Law in 1986 and of its enforcement 
regulations in 1988，which established the legal framework for wholly foreign owned 
subsidiaries, and (2) the desire of investors to avoid the various complications 
involved in joint ventures.^^ 
"Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates, “ JETRO 
China Newsletter, May-June 1993, p. 3. 
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economic relations between the mainland and the island. 
Table 5.3 
Direct Investment in China, by Country and Region (Contract Basis) 
(Unit: US$ mil.) 
Country/Region ^ 1992 
No. Value No. Value ^ Value 
Hong Kong 4.751 3,833.34 8,502 7 ,215.10 30,781 40,043.8 
Taiwan 1,103 889.97 1,735 1,388.52 6,430 5,543.4 
United States 357 357.82 694 548.08 3,265 3,121.3 
Japan 341 457.0 599 812.20 1,805 2,172.5 
Macau N/A N/A N/A N/A 1，111 1,487.3 
Singapore 72 103.49 169 155.21 742 996.6 
Thailand N/A N/A N/A N/A 407 丨 723.4 
South Korea 47 45.68 230 137.48 650 417.0 
Canada N/A N/A N/A N/A 394 315.5 
France N/A N/A 丨 N/A N/A 140 288.6 
Total 7,273 6,596.11 12,978 11,976.82 48,764 58,123.5 
Source: "Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92，" JETRO China Newsletter’ Jan.-Feb. 1993’ p. 19. 
"Foreign Investment in China by Country and Region, 1992," ibid., July - August 1993’ pp. 
19-20. 
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Kong and Macau, while Fujian received most from Taiwan. 
Table 5.4 
Direct Investment in China, by Chinese Region and Sector, 1992 (Contract Basis) 
(Unit: US$ mil.) 
Region/Sector Cases ^ o u n t 
Guangdong province 9,769 18’858.f 
Guangzhou city 1，193 4,491.5 
Shenzhencity 2，495.0 
Jiangsu province 7,854 7,161.6 
Nanjing city 陥 瓜 5 
Fujian province 113 6,351.0 
Xiamen city 丄 ， 劃 
Shandong province 4,109 3,919.6 
Qingdao city ^55 U36.2 
Shanghai city 2，903.3 
Zhejiang province 2 ,338 2 863 .3 
Ningbo city ^ 丄，服3 
Hainan province 2’261.1 
Liaoning province 2，147 
Shenyang city 631 ^38.8 
Dalian city ^ 994.9 
Hebei province M20 1,622.4 
Beijing city ^ 1，432.5 
Total of local regions 48,125 
Total 48,764 58,123.5 
Source: "Foreign Investment in China by Country and Region, 1992," JETRO China Newsletter, July-
August 1993, p. 22. 
Table 5.5 shows the top five provinces/cities in terms of the number of investment 
projects received in 1992. Guangdong held an unshakable number one position, but 
recently investment has also been flooding into Jiangsu and Shandong provinces, 
where there are many rural enterprises. These rural enterprises are fast becoming 
partners for joint ventures and joint enterprises. With Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
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Macau accounted for 81% of FDI in China and most of the investments were in 
Guangdong Province, these areas (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Guangdong) are 
sometimes considered as an impressive 'South China Economic Sphere'. 
Table 5.5 
Five Top Provinces/Cities in Investment (No. of Projects) 
1990 1991 1992 
Guangdong 3,042 projects Guangdong 4,554 projects Guangdong 9,769 projects 
US$2.69 bil. US$4.91 bil. US$18.86 bil. 
Fujian 1,043 projects Fujian 1,219 projects Jiangsu 7,854 projects 
US$1.16 bil. US$1.45 bil. US$7.16 bil. 
Jiangsu 393 projects Jiangsu 1,138 projects Shandong 4,109 projects 
US$220 mil. US$740 mil. US$3.92 bil. 
Liaoning 371 projects Shandong 801 projects Fujian 3,113 projects 
US$490 mil. US$660 mil. US$6.35 bil. 
Shandong 366 projects Beijing 727 projects Zhejiang 2,338 projects 
US$230 mil. US$290 mil. US$2.86 bil. 
Source: "Foreign Investment in China by Country and Region, 1992, “ JETRO China Newsletter, July-
August 1993， p. 22. 
"Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates," ibid., May-June 1993, p. 
4. 
5.4 INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS 
Here we come to a basic question why foreigners like to invest in China. What are 
the competitive advantages of China compared with other countries? China has been 
able to attract f o r e i g n investors for a number of reasons. Key among these a r e ? 
(1) the actual and potential size of the domestic market and a pressing need for rapid 
24jQseph Battat, "Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing Trends，" 
East Asian Executive Reports, August 15，1991，p. 13. 
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industrialization; (2) the abundance of low cost labour; (3) the availability of natural 
resources and land space; (4) the proximity to East and Southeast Asia, an area that 
has been undergoing impressive economic growth; and (5) the less restrictive 
environmental protection regulations than in some neighbouring countries. 
\ 
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C H A P T E R V I 
J A P A N E S E G L O B A L I N V E S T M E N T P A T T E R N 
6.1 JAPANESE FDI PATTERN WORLDWIDE 
Japanese FDI can be classified into three basic financial categories: (1) acquisition of 
securities; (2) loans and (3) establishment and expansion of overseas branches, as 
shown in table 6.1. Investment started to grow in the 1970，s and accelerated in the 
1980，s. However, in the 1990，s，the figures started to decline. According to Mikio 
Mori, director-general of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), a Japanese 
bank had conducted a survey for 1,600 manufacturing companies in Japan early 1993 ’ 
which indicated that 80% of respondents did not intend to invest more abroad. It is 
because many Japanese firms including banks and securities firms have been suffering 
from the so-called bubble economy, and they will be much more occupied with the 
restructuring of their own houses, at least for several years.^^ 
^^Keimeth Ko, "Japanese Firms hold back New China Funding," South China 
Morning Post - Business Post, October 9，1993，pp. 1,12. 
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Table 6.1 
Trends in Japanese Foreign Direct Investment 
(Unit: Projects, US$ mil.) 
Acquisition of Loans Establishment and Total 
Fiscal Securities Expansion of 
Year Overseas Branches 
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount 
1951- 12,799 17,634 7,698 16,958 914 1,309 23,949 36，497 
80 
1981 748 3,248 1,773 5,574 42 110 2,563 8,932 
1982 765 3,375 1,742 4,180 42 149 2,549 7,703 
1983 868 3,753 1,848 4,192 38 200 2,754 8，145 
1984 828 4,595 1,636 5,340 35 221 2,499 10,155 
1985 1,023 5,963 1,552 5,924 38 329 2,613 12,217 
1986 1,419 12,546 1,728 9,208 49 566 3,196 20,320 
1987 2,126 19,941 2,387 12,971 71 452 4,584’ 33,364 
1988 2,725 28,638 3,263 17.801 89 584 6,077 47,022 
1989 2,602 43,169 3,910 23,632 77 739 6,589 67,540 
1990 2,249 38,507 3,565 17,598 49 806 5,863 56,911 
1991 1,556 27,129 2,983 13,991 25 464 4,564 41,584 
1992 1,397 21,667 2,318 12,110 26 360 3,741 34,138 
Cumul 31,105 230,167 36,403 149,480 1,495 6,289 71,841 386,530 
ative 1 1 I I 
Source: "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment and FDI in Japan in 1992," Ministry of Finance, Japan, 
3 June 1993，p. 1. 
W.C. Ernest Lee; and M.K. Waynie So, Japanese Investment in Hong Kong Towards 1997 -
Its Implications and Future Direction, April 1992，p. 25. 
Table 6.2 shows the Japanese FDI by industry. In FY 1992，the major overseas 
investment in manufacturing included chemical, electric appliances, transport 
equipment and machinery. Non-manufacturing industries still dominated the global 
investment. These included services, real estate, commerce, finance and insurance. 
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Geographically, Japanese FDI mainly concentrated in North America, Europe and 
Asia as shown in table 6.3. The United States was the most important Japanese FDI 
site because of the huge bilateral trade volume and amount, which demanded great 
commerce and services supports from the non-manufacturing industries. The large 
U.S consumer market also had great demand for electric appliances from the 
manufacturing industries (see table 6.4). However, North America is losing ground 
to Asia gradually. As the Japanese global investment is declining (from US$56.9 
billion in FY 1990 to US$34.1 billion in FY 1992)，investment in Asia has risen 
rapidly with a share increased from 12.4% in FY 1990 to 18.8% in FY 1992. The 
share of China in Japan's investment, on a value basis, has also risen from the 0.61 % 
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6.2 JAPANESE FDI PATTERN IN CHINA 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 show the trend of Japanese investment in China. The data are 
tabulated in table 6.5. Another set of data is tabulated in table 6.6. Table 6.5 
indicates that in 1992，1,805 projects were approved, up 201.3% and worth a 
contracted US$2,172 million, up 167.5%. On the other hand, figures from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance in table 6.6, which show the foreign investments 
submitted to it for approval by Japanese firms, indicate that Japan invested in 490 
projects in China in fiscal 1992 (April 1，1992 to March 31，1993)，up 99.2% from 
the previous f i s c a l year, worth US$1,070 million (up 84.8%). We can find that there 
are some discrepancies both in the number of projects and the amount invested. The 
primary source of table 6.5 is Guoji Shangbao [International Commerce] while that 
of table 6.6 is Japanese Ministry of Finance. The major reasons for such 
discrepancies may be that China and Japan count the numbers with different bases and 
counting methods. For instance, there might be some Japanese companies outside 
Japan which had not submitted their figures to the Japanese Ministry of Finance. So 
the Japanese figures are smaller than the Chinese ones. Also the time bases are 
different. Japan counts from April to March while China counts from January to 
December. The different exchange rates among Rmb, FEC，US$ and Yen might also 
account for such differences because of the depreciation of Rmb together with the 
appreciation of Yen. Nevertheless, the general trends consistently show that the 
Japanese investment pace in China is accelerating even though Japanese global 
investment is contracting. 
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Figure 6.1 Figure 6,2 
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Table 6.5 
Trends in Investment by Japanese Companies in China 
(Unit: Projects, US$ mil.) 
Year No. of % increase over Contract % increase over 
projects the previous year value the previous year 
1987 113 20.2 301 43.3 
1988 237 109.7 276 -8.3 
1989 294 24.1 439 59.1 
1990 341 16.0 457 ^ 
1991 599 75.7 812 77.7 
1992 1,805 201.3 2,172 167.5 
Cumulative at end of 1992 3,694 5,973 
Source: "Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates, “ JETRO China Newsletter, 
May-June 1993, p. 5. 
"Foreign Investment in China by Country and Region, 1992," ibid., July - August 1993, pp. 
19-20. 
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Table 6.6 
Japanese FDI - China versus Global 
(Unit: Cases, US$ mil.) 
China Global 
Year No. % A % of Amt. % A % of No. % A Amt. % A 
global global | | 1 1 
FY 1988 171 - 2.8 296 - 0.63 6077 - 47022 
FY 1989 126 -26.3 1.9 438 48.0 0-65 6589 8.4 67540 43.6 
FY 1990 165 31.0 2.8 349 -20.3 0.61 5863 -11.0 56911 -15.7 
FY 1991 246 49.1 5.4 579 65.9 1.39 4564 -22.2 41584 -26.9 
FY 1992 490 99.2 13.1 1070 84.8 3.13 3741 -18.0 34138 -17.9 
Cumulative FY 1595 2.2 4472 1.16 71541 386530 
1951 - 1992 I I I I 
Source: "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment and FDI in Japan in 1992," Ministry of Finance. Japan, 3 June 1993’ p. 2. 
W.C. Ernest Lee; and M.K. Waynie So, Japanese Investment in Hong Kong Towards 1997 - Its Implications and 
Future Direction, April 1992, p. 30. 
Table 6.7 summarizes the Japanese direct investment in China by provinces. 
Geographically, Japanese companies tended to invest in Dalian in Liaoning province, 
Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Beijing, Qingdao in Shandong province, and other 
coastal cities north of the Changjiang river. More up-to-date information shows that 
by the end of September 1992, the cumulative share of Japanese investment in overall 
investment in China was only 4.5% in terms of the number of projects and 6.5% in 
terms of value. In Shanghai, however, Japanese companies account for 14% of the 
projects and 16% of the value, while in Beijing they account for 14% of the projects 
and 19% of the value, and in Dalian 30% of the projects and 46% of the value.^^ 
26’’Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates," JETRO 
China Newsletter, May-June 1993，p. 5. 
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Table 6.7 
Agreement of Japanese Direct Investment in China by Provinces 
Amount in US$10，000 
Region 1987 1988 1989 1991 
No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt. 
Liaoning 11 3820 52 6287 64 14823 68 2818 132 24615 
Shanghai 12 460 23 2210 29 2771 33 2393 49 13169 
Guangdong 19 3783 23 4257 23 2398 15 3100 33 12451 
Jiangsu 5 430 15 1352 23 2663 39 1091 81 9214 
Shandong ^ 365 _ ^ 2212 _ 1 2 5 7 _ 3 1 _ 2551 _ ^ 4156 
Beijing 13 11240 16 1023 38 2606 29 892 60 1879 
Zhejiang 3 338 10 947 7 201 18 450 28 1670 
Fujian 10 713 13 1071 10 1303 24 1977 19 957 
Hainan 15 7696 19 1639 12 649 12 716 
Tianjin 11 214 _ 1 4 1858 _ 1 4 2512 _ 1 2 1628 _ 3 3 660 
Hebei 1 13 4 294 7 1379 6 158 12 452 
Jilin 3 123 3 106 8 157 9 407 18 315 
Heilongjiang 3 30 5 161 8 285 6 93 17 305 
Henan 1 23 1 48 4 304 7 299 
Guangxi 1 37 _ 1 ^ 1 2000 _ 3 239 
Sichuan 1 70 1 16 4 204 5 97 5 157 
Shaanxi 1 23 1 16 2 103 5 97 5 151 
Anhui 4 39 2 56 6 345 5 139 
Hunan 2 42 1 25 1 104 5 101 
Hubei _ 1 _ 一 _ L ^ _ i . _ _ L E -
Jiangxi 1 13 4 51 3 54 
Gansu 2 1022 1 27 
Guizhou 1 13 2 12 
Yunnan 5 97 1 12 
Shanxi , _ L L . 
Xinjiang 1 243 1 250 
Inner Mongolia 1 7 1 46 1 5 
Tibet 
Qinghai 
Ningxia I I I I 
Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics (Beijing: China Statistical Information & Consultancy Service Centre, 
1992), pp. 404-405. 
Japan has less exposure in the south, where Hongkong and Taiwan businessmen are 
more active. In the Pearl River delta, Japanese businessmen prefer to sign low-risk 
production contracts rather than put in long-term capital. The Citizen Watch group, 
for example, has been placing annual orders, via its Hongkong subsidiary, Walop 
I 
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Ltd, for up to 500,000 parts with a Chinese factory in Guangdong province since 
1988. 
The industries which the Japanese companies involve in China are mainly labour-
intensive types such as textiles, garment, electrical machinery and food, and of the 
type which requires locating near sources of raw materials, such as ceramics and 
building materials. Big Japanese firms are continuously moving into China. For 
example, Sharp set up an air-conditioner joint venture in Shanghai, while electronics 
giant NEC built a ¥8 billion plant in the northeastern city of Tianjin to make 
telephone switchboards. NEC also set up a ¥26 billion factory in Beijing to produce 
large-scale integrated circuits. Hitachi Ltd. started a joint venture in Shenzhen to 
build TV tubes, which were then exported. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.'s 
Beijing venture sells picture tubes to Chinese TV makers, who export most of their 
sets. Isuzu Motors Ltd in Shenyang is hiking the number of trucks it makes in 
China.27 
Below we try to look in more detail about Japanese investment in China by taking two 
Japanese companies as examples. One is Canon in Dalian for the manufacturing 
industry and the other is Yaohan in Beijing and Shanghai for the retailing industry. 
27ISUZU supplies diesel engines and trucks that are badged as GM models. In 
January 1992, General Motors and Shenyang Jinbei Automobile Shareholding Co. 
formed a US$100 million joint venture to make pickup trucks in China. GM takes 
a 30% equity share. For details, please refer to Carl Goldstein, "Catch as Catch can: 
US Car Giant Redoubles push into Asia," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 19， 
1991, pp. 42-43. 
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6.3 CANON IN DALIAN 
Canon's main business is computer and office equipment. Before 1992，Canon 
already has had two Chinese ventures in Beijing and Zhuhai. In February 1992, a 
new US$150-million Canon typewriter and laser printer cartridge factory was opened. 
It is the largest wholly-owned Japanese investment in China. Under the terms of the 
contract Canon must export all its production for the first years of operation. After 
that it will be allowed to sell 20% into the domestic market. 
Dalian is the most favoured destination for Japanese firms. From 1984-90，Japanese 
companies established 159 joint-venture, cooperative production or wholly owned 
companies in Dalian with a total value of more than US$550 million. This 
investment accounted for more than 35% of foreign investment in Dalian in the 
period.28 In 1992, out of 700 Japanese firms active in China, 200 had operations 
in the area of the Liaoning province port c i t y , 
Dalian, in northeast China, has a reputation as a tough city. With its large port, 
heavy industrial base and history of occupation - by the Russians and the Japanese -
its people have had their character-forming experiences. Maybe that's why other 
Chinese say about Dalian folk:，They never quarrel. They just fight.' Table 6.8 
28Robert Delfs and Louise do Rosario, "Sense or Sensibility: Historical Mistrust 
Hampers Marriage of Capital and Cheap Labour," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
April 25, 1991，p. 54. 
29Louise do Rosario, "Tailored to Fit: Japan and China Find They Complement 
Each Other," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 22，1992，p. 53. 
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gives some information about Dalian. 
Table 6.8 
Dalian at a glance 
Population: 2.4 million in 1992 
Distance from Beijing: 457 km 
Major industries: Ship building, petrochemicals, textiles, electronics, tourism, 
fisheries. 
Infrastructure: One of China's leading ports, 
Dalian Economic and Technical Development Zone, 
international airport, Shenyang-Dalian expressway. 
Major foreign investors: Canon, Total, Holiday Inn, Onoda Cement Co, Mabuchi Motor. 
Major investing countries: Japan, Hongkong-Macau，the U.S., Taiwan, South Korea. 
Foreign banks: Hongkong Bank, Tokyo Bank. 
Educational institutions: Dalian University of Technology, Dalian Marine College. 
Source: Brian Caplen, "No quarrels: Just fights," Asian Business, January 1993’ p. 46. 
Between 1984, when Dalian was opened to foreign investment, and mid-1992, foreign 
companies invested US$1.44 billion in the city, most of it in the development zone 
just to the north. That was about half the total for Liaoning province. By the end 
of 1992，there have been 624 FFEs in Dalian. 219 FFEs started their operations in 
1992.30 丁he i n v e s t m e n t that is now arriving is of an increasingly hi-tech nature. 
Besides Canon, Mabuchi Motor has made sizeable profits from its factory turning out 
small electric motors in Dalian. 
There are two factors accounted for Canon choosing Dalian as its investment site. 
^^Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Beijing: China 
Social Publishing House, 1993)，p. 259. 
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First is transportation. In 1992，Dalian port had 55 shipping terminals. Goods 
shipped weighed 5.9 million tons. In fact Japan accounted for 58.44% (US$724 
million) of Dalian's export and 61.16% of Dalian's import (US$403 million) in 
1992.31 "One reason Dalian was chosen is the convenience of the transportation,” 
said Canon Dalian Business Machines' general manager Sun Yu Min, "We ship out 
more than 10 containers a day and transfer to Dalian port takes less than an hour. 
When Dayao Bay (a new, nearby port area) is completed it will take only 20 
minutes.“ 
Another factor is labour. The wages for Chinese labour are low in general. Canon 
is delighted with its 1,300 Dalian workers, 70% of whom are women. "Our Japanese 
managers have said many times that the women workers here are clever, skilled, 
honest - and better than some Japanese workers," said Sun. 
6.4 YAOHAN IN BEIJING AND SHANGHAI 
Both Beijing and Shanghai are China's major cities under the direct administration of 
the State Council. Beijing is the Chinese capital with a population about 10 million. 
It is an ancient cultural city with a host of historical relics. Major industries in 
Beijing are chemical, electronics, arts and crafts, metallurgical, machinery, textiles 
and food. Shanghai is China's largest economic centre on the East China Sea, it 
evenly divides China's long coastline, in-between the Hangzhou Gulf to its south and 
^^Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Beijing: China 
Social Publishing House, 1993), p. 259. 
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the estuary of the Yangtze River to its north. Pudong is Shanghai's new development 
district. Shanghai has increased its economic contacts with foreign countries and 
launched many joint ventures. Examples are Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive 
Company with Germany, the Shanghai Squibb Pharmaceuticals and the Shanghai 
Foxboro Company with the United States, and the Shanghai Broadway Wooltex Ltd 
with Hongkong. Table 6.9 illustrates some information about Shanghai. 
J 
Table 6.9 
Shanghai at a glance 
Population: About 13 million in 1991 
Major industries: Metallurgy, chemicals, machine building, ship building, electronics, metres 
and instruments, textiles, light industry，handicrafts, and pharmaceuticals. 
Infrastructure: Power plants, coal gas factories, airports, harbour areas, railway hub 
between the north and south, ports. 
Major foreign investors: Volkswagen Automotive, Squibb Pharmaceuticals, Foxboro，China-
Schindler Elevator, Broadway Wooltex, Yaohan. 
Major investing countries: Japan, Hongkong-Macau, the U.S.，Germany, Taiwan. 
Foreign banks: Hongkong Bank, Standard Charteretl Bank, Overseas-Chinese Bank. 
Educational institutions: Shanghai Jiaotong University, Fudan University, the East China Teachers 
University, 
Source: Guide to Economic & Technical Cooperation and Investment in China (Beijing: China Economy 
Publishing House, 1988)，pp. 199-203. 
Yaohan International Holdings is a holding company for Yaohan's three listed 
subsidiaries in Hong Kong, namely, Yaohan Food Processing & Trading Co.，Yaohan 
Hong Kong Corp. and Yaohan International Caterers Ltd. Yaohan International is 
the group's main vehicle for investing in China. In April 1989, Yaohan moved its 
headquarters from Japan to Hong Kong. In June 1992, Yaohan reached joint venture 
agreement with different parties in Shanghai and Beijing to operate local department 
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Stores. The store in Beijing utilized an existing building structure and opened in 
December 1992 whereas the one in Shanghai is constructed from ground. The 
Shanghai project is a US$100 million joint-venture deal with Shanghai Number One 
Department Store to establish a 100,000-square-meter store in Pudong, where Yaohan 
takes 55% share and Shanghai Number One holds the balance. Yaohan is the first 
foreign retailer to become directly involved in large-scale retailing on the mainland. 
Upon completion in late 1995, the centre will be the biggest shopping mall in both 
China and Asia. Yaohan is also establishing a wholesale distribution complex in 
Beijing which would be completed by late 1995. The next step is to establish a 
department store in Guangzhou with Guangdong Investment. It is expected Yaohan 
would set up no less than 1,000 stores in China by 2010 and its sales to top US$7.5 
billion by 2020. Many of these stores would be run under franchise agreements with 
local partners. The chairman Kazuo Wada estimated that Yaohan，s capital investment 
in China will total about US$200 million by the end of 1 9 9 5 ? However, Yaohan 
in Beijing currently has faced quite a number of problems.�� Few customers, 
currency problem, lack of managerial expertise and severe competition made Yaohan 
wonder whether its contemplated project in Pudong, Shanghai, is too ambitious in the 
current environment. Its Beijing partner does not have the capital to underwrite the 
scheme. If Yaohan wants to raise substantial funds it must either look for another 
partner locally or turn to Tokyo and risk losing even more money if the renminbi 
drops further. Nevertheless, such problems are generally encountered by many 
32peter Stein, "Yaohan Expects Healthy Results on China Sales," The Asian Wall 
Street Journal, March 1，1994, p. 4. 
^^Henny Sender, "No bed of roses: Yaohan discovers the business perils of 
China, “ Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5’ 1993, p. 64. 
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foreign companies during the initial set-up stage. We expect the problems would be 
resolved when the retail industry in China becomes more mature. 
Besides the department store business, in October 1992，Yaohan International together 
with a Chinese company CVIC (China Venturetech Investment Co.) set up a holding 
company in the Mainland China. In 1993，the holding company joined the Japanese 
Mos Food Services Inc and planned to develop 3,000 franchised fast food restaurants 
in China by 2010. The first restaurant would be opened in Shanghai in May 1994.34 
The joint venture is named Yaohan Mos Food Services International Company 
(Y.M.C. International). The total initial capital investment is HK$10 million. 
Yaohan and Mos Food each holds 35% of the shares while CVIC holds 30%. 
China's State Statistical Bureau reported that retail sales jumped to Rmb 265.9 billion 
in the first quarter of 1992 and the boom is expected to grow. Therefore, Japanese 
firms are currently targeting major Chinese cities whose residents' purchasing power 
has been rising fastest. That is the major reason why Yaohan chose Beijing and 
Shanghai for its retail business development. 
6.5 TREND OF JAPANESE FDI IN CHINA 
A look at the trends in investments of Japanese companies revealed a broadening of 
the fields of investment. In the manufacturing sector, in addition to previously 
34 "八 ®伴擬購商場以增加土地儲備，〃明報， [ " Y a o h a n plans to 
buy shopping centres to increase its land reserves," Ming Pao，] March 1’ 1994, p. 
B2. 
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prominent labour-intensive industries, investments have also been getting into fields 
such as automobiles, communications equipment, and ferrous metals. This is due in 
part to the alignment with the China's industrial policy of the eighth five year plan 
(1991-95) and in part to the improvement in income levels in China's cities which 
results in the Chinese huge consumer market. As China's economic reform and open 
door policy become more firmly entrenched, large-scale investment from Japan in the 
energy and material industries has also been growing. In November, 1992, the press 
暴 
reported the start of a feasibility study on the joint construction of a petrochemical 
complex, involving investment of as much as 500 billion yen, in Yingkou, Liaoning 
Province, by six major trading companies. Thus, Japanese companies are moving 
beyond the old incentives such as China's inexpensive labour force.^^ 
In the non-manufacturing sector, investment has been picking up in tertiary industries 
such as retailing, wholesaling and warehousing, finance and real estate, trucking and 
shipping, law offices and tourism development. In the retail field, following the path 
of Yaohan, three companies, namely, Sogo, Seibu and Daiei of Japan have decided 
to set up stores in Puxi (the administrative and commercial centre of the old 
Shanghai), Shenzhen and Beijing respectively. China's first foreign-owned trading 
companies were established in Pudong by Itochu (the former C. Itoh), Sumitomo 
Corporation, Mitsui & Co.，and Marubeni. The joint venture Dalian Industrial Park 
Investment Corporation (DIPIC) has also been formally established to take charge of 
the development and operation of the Dalian Japanese Industrial Estate, a large-scale 
35”Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92, “ JETRO China Newsletter’ Jan.-Feb. 
1993， p. 21 . 
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joint Sino-Japanese project.^^ 
"Foreign Investment in the PRC, 1991-92, “ JETRO China Newsletter, Jan.-Feb. 
1993， p. 21. 
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C H A P T E R V I I 
J A P A N E S E I N V E S T M E N T A P P R O A C H IN T H E P R C 
7.1 JAPANESE APPROACH 
In the first half of the 1980s，Japanese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) hesitated 
to commit to major investment in China, preferring to sell to the Chinese market� 
As a result, Japan quickly became China's major trading partner. Japanese executives 
have long referred to joint ventures in China as "joint adventures." This sobriquet 
reveals an old uneasiness about Chinese investments. Most Japanese firms are 
cautious about the China market mainly because of the different economic system in 
China. They prefer to trade because the risks are less. 
In 1987，the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) led a group of 70 
Japanese businessmen on an investment mission to China. In December 1988, the 
Sino-Japanese bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was completed. It is a legitimate 
vehicle for promoting and protecting foreign investment in China.^^ In September 
37The Sino-Japanese BIT contains 5 board subject areas: 1. scope of coverage, 2. 
type of treatment, 3. standard of compensation in the event of expropriation or 
nationalization, 4. transfers of foreign exchange, and 5. settlement of disputes. For 
details, please refer to - Laurence W. Bates, "Protecting Foreign Investments in 
China:'The Sino-Japanese Bilateral Investment Treaty," East Asian Executive Reports, 
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1992, Chinese trade officials complained about the low level of investment when 
members of Japan's big-business organisation Keidanren visited China. Strong 
pressure from the Chinese government and the rise in the value of the yen have led 
to a steady stream of Japanese FDI projects in China. Beijing's austerity program, 
designed to replace imports with Chinese-made goods, is also forcing the Japanese 
to shift from trade to investments. With the production costs rising in such countries 
as South Korea and Thailand, the Japanese firms are turning to China, Indonesia and 
Vietnam, seeking to shift their production facilities to cheaper bases. In recent years, 
Japanese investments in China have risen, against the general three-year decline in 
their investments worldwide. 
7.2 OTHER INVESTORS' APPROACHES 
In order to compared with the Japanese investment approach in China, here we also 
look at three Asian investors' approaches - Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. 
In 1992，Hong Kong provided about 69% of total FDI in China. The investment 
were concentrated on textile and electronics types which required cheap and ample 
labour supplies. The geographical proximity and the 1997 issue make Hong Kong 
special for China. Thus many Hong Kong people like to invest in China, particularly 
in Guangdong. As prices rise, Hong Kong investors are now moving North and 
inland. For example, Pacific Concord Holdings has launched a US$300-million joint 
venture in Shanghai to build an 88-story office tower. Meanwhile, Wharf (Holdings) 
December 15，1988，pp. 9-14. 
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Ltd put more than US$1 billion into Wuhan.^« Many foreign companies also treat 
Hong Kong as a gateway to access the China businesses. The key factor in 
determining whether these FDI flows continue will be the way China implements its 
'one-country, two systems' strategy after 1997 and how this affects business 
confidence. 
In 1992, Taiwan held second place as a source of FDI flows to China. The 
investments were also concentrated in the labour-intensive electronics, plastic products 
and machinery sectors. A wide range of economic, political and cultural imperatives 
has made FDI from Taiwan most attractive to China. Chinese officials and 
industrialists feel very comfortable dealing with Taiwanese business people. Although 
the Chinese and Taiwanese have lived under different economic systems during the 
last 40 years, they come from the same society, share a common culture, values and 
language, and have strong family sense. Moreover, China seems to be more than 
willing to begin to bridge its political and ideological schism with Taiwan through 
improved economic relations. Taiwanese business people, like their Hong Kong 
counterparts, are more likely than other foreign investors to respond to Chinese 
efforts to attract FDI in natural resources, infrastructure and real estate development. 
Most South Korean investment in China is also in labour-intensive areas - electronics, 
toys, processed foods, apparel and household items. China offers a vast and 
diversified market in Asia and access to natural resources. Moreover, for geopolitical 
38pete Engardio, "Mainland Mania in Hong Kong, Business Week. August 17’ 
1993, p. 48. 
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reasons, the South Korean government is very supportive of domestic businesses 
expanding their economic relations with China. Korean investors are also moving 
inland. Today the top three Korea's chaebols are Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo, 
while Samsung has opened branch offices in Qingdao and Chongqing.^^ 
All the direct investors have a common base, that is, they want to utilize the cheap 
Chinese labour. Among the investing countries, Japanese investment seems to 
J 
provide a relative high-level technology such as that in electrical appliance and 
automobile industries. South Korea seems to provide a medium-level technology, 
while Hong Kong and Taiwan provide low-level technology. Hong Kong and 
Taiwan's management approaches are more suited to China because of the same 
cultural background and language. Japan is the most aggressive investor aiming at 
the huge Chinese market. 
7.3 INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR J^^ANESE INVESTORS 
Why Japan wants to invest in China? What are the motivators? Previously, Japanese 
companies grew quickly because of the huge U.S. market. However, there has been 
a trade war between Japan and the United States recently. Japan's economy is also 
under a recession and the Yen is too strong. On the other hand, China can provide 
cheap labour, lower R & D investment and huge market. Investing in China can 
increase the efficiency and sustain the Japan's economic growth to a certain extent. 
39"Samsung Co.: Focusing on China's Northeast," Business Korea, July 1993, p. 
62. 
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Also it is consistent with the Japanese never-ending expansion strategy. 
Japanese firms' move to South Asia is backed to the hilt by the government, which 
provides a special fund to help them put together joint ventures with local businesses, 
insures them against commercial risks, and manages a huge foreign aid programme 
usually tied to purchases of Japanese equipment. The Ministry of International 
Trade (MITI), Japan Development Bank and the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) do great jobs in this aspect. 
In particular JETRO is mentioned. It is a nonprofit government-related organization 
established in 1958. Its mission is to maintain harmonious trade relationships 
between Japan and other countries. To support Japanese companies interested in 
overseas expansion, JETRO cooperates with associations representing such companies 
by providing information on trade, investment, and technology transfer. Consulting 
services and introductions to possible trading partners are also provided. 
Furthermore, to encourage internationalization, JETRO would provide support for 
small and medium-sized Japanese companies to take part in overseas trade fairs/i 
John Fukuda, Japanese Management in East Asia and Beyond (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1993), p. 13. 
'^^JETRO - Japan External Trade Organization (Japan: n.p.’ 1993), pp. 1, 9. 
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C H A P T E R VIII 
P R O B L E M S F A C E D B Y J A P A N E S E I N V E S T O R S IN T H E P R C 
8.1 GENERAL PROBLEMS 
In general, foreign investment in China has been hindered by: (1) an absence of 
consistent and steady foreign investment and related economic policies; (2) the 
frictions, if not incompatibility, between China's socialist, centrally planned economic 
system and the market-orientation of FDI; (3) the Chinese bureaucracy; (4) the strong 
competition from East and Southeast Asian countries for export-oriented FDI projects; 
and (5) the overheated economy. 
According to a questionnaire survey conducted by the Japan-China Investment 
Promotion Organization, there are several problems faced by the Japanese companies 
in their China operations (see table 8.1). For manufacturing, procuring materials is 
the most serious problem while for service, infrastructure is most serious. These 
problems are consistently related to the overheated economy in China. Therefore, we 
can say that the overheated economy is the main current issue faced by not only the 
Japanese companies but also general investors in China. Rising expenses and prices 
are related to the overheated economy also. The labour problems might be related 
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to the Chinese bureaucracy. Lack of laws and institutions are related to the socialist 
market economy. Tax system is related to the economic policies. One problem 
which might be regarded unique for Japanese investors is quality control. Japanese 
products have long been famous for their high quality while Chinese products are 
famous for low prices at the expense of poor quality. Such a big gap in the concept 
of quality has caused a lot of unresolved issues between the Japanese and the Chinese 
parties. 
Table 8.1 
Problems Faced by Japanese Companies in their China operations 
Item Manufacturing Service 
No. of firms % No. of firms ^ 
Procuring materials in China 48 12.1 1 36.8 
Rising expenses and prices 23 34.8 4 21.1 
Delivery and transport in import and export 21 31.8 0 
Production and quality control 21 31.8 2 10.5 
Labour management and personnel 20 30.3 6 31.6 
Wages, welfare, and benefits 18 27.3 S 42.1 
Employment 16 24.2 8 42.1 
Lack of laws and institutions 15 22.7 5 26.3 
Infrastructure 12 18.2 9 47.4 
Relations with Chinese partners 12 18.2 5 26.3 
Tax system 11 16.7 10 52.6 
Dealing with government U 16.7 I 5.3 
Export-related problems 9 13.6 0 15.8 
Fund raising 8 12.1 3 5.3 
Poor sales 7 10.6 1 
No response 5 7.6 1 5.3 
Others 4 6.1 8 42.1 
Nothing in particular I ^ 
No. of companies responding 66 19 丨 丨 
Source: "Recent Trends in investment and operations of foreign affiliates, “ JETRO China Newsletter, 
May-June 1993，p. 6. 
Related to table 8.1, we can summarize the problems in seven aspects: 
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First, in the manufacturing industries, problems with securing materials in China were 
mentioned most often. Also they found it difficult to obtain steel, cement, and other 
materials for building factories. Chinese companies were unwilling to fill their orders 
partly because Japanese affiliates make tough demands in terms of delivery and 
quality. 
Second, soaring costs and prices were mentioned, in particular the personnel costs. 
Most companies indicated that the recent average annual increase in wages was 15 to 
20%. There is a shortage of middle management, engineers, accountants, 
interpreters, and other specialists, resulting in the appearance of head-hunting between 
FFEs and state-run enterprises. Meanwhile, the land usage and factory construction 
costs have continued to soar as compared with those prevailing when they conducted 
their feasibility studies. 
Third, problems were found in both product and process quality control. Also 
mentioned were inadequate physical distribution infrastructure, such as the limited 
capacity of the ports to handle imports and exports of products and materials and 
customs clearance procedures. 
Fourth, many companies indicated there were problems in the areas of labour and 
personnel management and in relations with Chinese partners. With the local 
governments being given greater authority , there are some grey areas in central laws 
and local regulations. For example, local governments might start to charge FFEs 
for infrastructure development, power station construction and even greenification 
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through establishing their own regulations. Furthermore, disputes between partners 
has also been rising. There have been scattered incidents involving the Chinese 
partner making use of what the Japanese considered private property or diverting 
materials and funds for its own use. This kind of trouble is due in part to differences 
in thinking of Chinese and Japanese, but nonetheless creates an atmosphere of mutual 
distrust and gradually escalating friction. In other cases, when a need for further 
operating funds arises, despite contracts calling for the parties to raise additional 
4 
funds according to their equity shares, the Chinese partners prove unable to raise 
funds. 
Fifth, the localities cannot construct the power, heating and water, transportation, and 
communications infrastructure fast enough to keep up with demand. Over 70% of the 
responding manufacturing companies indicated that they had problems with 
arrangement for trucks. For service industries, these shortages have an even broader 
J 
effect. 
Sixth, many service companies indicated they were having problems with the tax 
system. The reason is that fewer tax incentives are provided to the service industries 
than the manufacturing industries. The main complaint is over the inequality between 
the unified industrial and commercial tax assessed on the domestic sales of the FFEs 
and the value-added tax assessed on domestic companies. 
Seventh, the export ratio could be changed easily simply due to the pressure from 
domestic enterprises in the same field. Export prices are also raised by the 
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government in some cases. Companies often have difficulty obtaining export permits. 
Recently, trouble has also arisen over the dissolution of joint ventures. The 
liquidation proceedings fail to progress due to conditions imposed by the government 
authorities or lack of cooperation from the Chinese partners. 
All these troubles are due mainly to the immature legal system in China, the lack of 
J 
central government guidance and supervision over the local authorities, and the 
inexperience of the Chinese partners. The Japan-China Investment Promotion 
Organization tries to resolve problems together with its Chinese counterpart, the 
China-Japan Investment Commission. Although there are so many problems, FFEs 
continue to invest in China simply because of profits. 
8.2 NEW TAX SYSTEM IN CHINA 
China used to give special tax allowances for foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) in 
order to attract foreign investment. All FFEs paid 33% tax on profits while state 
enterprises paid 55 %. Within the 33 % tax, 30% was gone to central government and 
3% to local government. Exceptions were found in the five Special Economic Zones 
[SEZs] and the 14 coastal economic and technological development zones, where 
corporate tax was 15%. 
In order to boost the revenue of the central government and bring the tax burden of 
China's state enterprises into line with foreign firms, on January 1’ 1994，China 
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began to carry out wide-ranging structural reforms on the industrial and commercial 
taxes. A summary of the new taxes is shown in appendix 4. 
The new system abolishes the old Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax on 
sales. In its place is a European-style value-added tax on production, mostly at a rate 
of 17%. Companies are also to be charged a uniform 33% corporate tax, reducing 
the burden on state enterprises, which had previously been taxed at 55% of profits. 
The number of industrial and commercial taxes has also been reduced from 32 to 18, 
more in order to simplify collection than to help companies. A capital-gains tax will 
be charged on sales of property and stocks, and a new graduated personal income tax 
will apply to Chinese and foreigners alike. Service businesses, such as finance, 
construction and transportation firms, also will be charged an income tax on a sliding 
scale ranging from 3% to as high as 20% for bars, nightclubs and luxury hotels. A 
stiff new consumption tax will increase charges for tobacco, alcohol and 
automobiles. 42 
As a result, all FFEs approved after January 1, 1994 shall pay their taxes according 
to the newly established tax rules. They are also subjected to pay the value-added 
taxes, consumption taxes and business taxes.*� For those approved before December 
31, 1993, the taxes will be refunded upon their application and the tax office's 
42Laurence Zuckerman, "China's New Taxes Puzzle Foreigners," The Asian Wall 
Street Journal, January 3, 1994, p. 4. 
43"Tax Reforms Entail No Added Burdens to FFEs - Official Policy," China 
Economic News, January 31, 1994, p. 3. 
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approval, for a period of no more than five years/* Local incentives, such as the 
15% tax rate on FFEs in SEZs, will remain. After all, foreign businesses will end 
up paying more taxes, especially in light of a 33% devaluation of the Chinese 
currency, which also went into effect January 1，1994. As a whole, the new tax 
system has negative impact on FDI in China. 
8.3 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
J 
Technology transfer (TT) can be defined as the geographical movement of means or 
methods so as to improve the goods or services provided. FDI is regarded as one of 
the major channels for TT. The first TT from Japan after the People's Republic was 
established was in 1963 when Kurashiki Rayon exported a vinylon plant and provided 
guidance in the construction of the facilities and in the operation of the plant. TT 
continued and in 1991，for instance, Hitachi announced plans to supply VCR 
technology to three Chinese-owned plants. Japan is famous for technology fusion. 
China has a large domestic market which creates a demand-driven environment. 
These should make Technology Transfer be beneficial to both Japan and China 
theoretically. However, the transfers of Japanese technology were not proceeding all 
that smoothly. Below summarizes the confusion over TT between Japan and 
China.45 
44"Decision on the Use of Interim Regulations Concerning Value-added Taxes, 
Consumption Taxes and Business Taxes on FFEs and Foreign Enterprises," China 
Economic News, January 31, 1994，p. 7. 
45Masumi Watanabe, "Some Thoughts on Technology Transfer," JETRO China 
Newsletter, Mar.-Apr. 1993, pp. 8-9. 
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First, from the Japanese side, it claims: 
(1) The Chinese have little conception of intellectual property rights and they tend 
to access the value of technology lightly; 
(2) The Chinese are not willing to introduce technology in a realistic manner in 
stages and irritate the Japanese with their demands for the latest technology 
at the very outset; 
(3) The Chinese demand the Japanese side guarantee the manufacturing quality, 
based on the idea of Japanese responsibility for technical development; 
(4) The Chinese have no perception of the obligation of confidentiality in TT and 
make copies to other sectors frequently. 
From the Chinese side, it claims: 
(1) The Japanese are unwilling to disclose their latest technology; 
(2) The Japanese believe that the Japanese way is the best and unilaterally push 
Japanese methods on the Chinese side; 
(3) The Japanese delay and take too long to resolve problems; 
(4) The Japanese ask for written guarantees on all manner. They are overly rigid 
and needlessly prolong negotiations; 
(5) The Japanese charge too much for TT and for training. 
The problem of TT does have negative feedback impact on FDI. However, this is 
not non-negotiable. Understanding the bottom-lines of both parties can help in 
resolving the issue. After all, for Japanese companies, starting up projects in China 
and transferring the technology suited for those projects there would start new 
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exchanges and in the end lead to strong commercial rights in China. Chinese should 
aim at the most suitable technology for its development instead of the most advanced 
one. 
The biggest problem in improving the level of technology in China is the shortage of 
suitable manpower. The 10-year gap in education wrought by the Cultural Revolution 
has cast a shadow over China's economic development. The authorities have recently 
been working to improve technical education, but it will be some time before the 
country can successfully digest and absorb the sophisticated technology which it 
imports. 
8.4 CORRUPTION 
Corruption in China is always a problem faced by foreign investors. Some Chinese 
use a more implicit word Fangbian (convenience or special allowance). Foreign 
executives working in China are always approached by slick operators (many of them 
are actually local and central government officials) offering to make deals, get 
approvals, or nail down allocations on condition that a hefty amount of foreign 
currency is paid into their foreign bank accounts. Part of the reason for spiralling 
corruption is the new round of corporate frenzy to get into China and start production 
as soon as possible. 
In the negative viewpoint, there is growing opportunity for corruption. Under the 
communist economy, the problem would not be so prominent because there is no 
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private property. However, under the liberalized market economy, corruption grows 
drastically. This phenomenon occurs because modem China has no deep tradition of 
law, not to mention business ethics and economic principles, so many people operate 
in the belief that there is no crime if nobody is caught. Money is the new religion. 
Guanxi (connections) continue to be an important bureaucratic fact of life in China. 
You have to know the multiple lines of communication and the levers of influence. 
Corruption can be used as a mean to build up Guanxi. 
4 
In order to curb the problem, the Chinese government has launched many province-
wide anti-corruption campaigns. Recently, more than 300,000 officials in Anhui'^ ^ 
have been caught siphoning off or misusing public fiinds. They used public money 
to offer high-interest loans, build private houses, buy high-class furniture, gamble and 
visit prostitutes. Bribes, embezzlement and kick-backs are a way of their l i v e s . 
Nevertheless, it seems that the corruption problem is so extensive that it cannot be 
J 
solved in the near future. 
46Anhui is one of China's poorest provinces and one where the gap between 
coastal urban wealth and rural inland poverty has been growing. 
47"Charges Against 300,000 Officials reveal deep corruption in China, “ The Asian 
Wall Street Journal, January 5, 1994, p. 3. 
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C H A P T E R IX 
P R O J E C T I O N O F J A P A N E S E FDI IN T H E P R C 
9.1 THE OUTLOOK OF FDI M CHINA 
Three key factors are likely to shape China's FDI environment:48 (1) first is political 
stability, in particular China is poised at the end of a leadership cycle; (2) second is 
economic policies. Will the economic and business environment improve enough to 
attract FDI? Now several factors might work against the China's economic reforms. 
Examples are the leadership's unwillingness to lose power and privileges that may 
result from reform; the Chinese authorities' fear that China would experience political 
and economic upheavals similar to those seen 1989 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union; (3) third is the relationship between China and its competitive Asia Pacific 
neighbours. Traditionally, China has developed a preference for minimizing 
interaction with the outside world. Only in the last decade or so has China renewed 
efforts to expand its international economic relations. The pace at which China is 
able and willing to continue this open-door policy will help shape its economic role 
in the future. 
48Joseph Battat, "Foreign Investment in China in the 90s: Developing Trends," 
East Asian Executive Reports, August 15, 1991，p. 16. 
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If the Chinese elite are able to follow a stable political and economic course in the 
next five years, the second half of the 1990s may hold a more positive scenario and 
the boom in investment in China is expected to continue. However, the objectives 
have been changing. In the past, the emphasis was on the establishment of export 
processing-type production centres, while the weight is now shifting to investments 
with a domestic market orientation. There will also be an increase in investments 
aimed at the supply of materials and parts for the FFEs and at performing sub-
contract processing for them. There have also been investments involving the 
simultaneous construction of production plants and the establishment of sales networks 
so as to secure domestic sales channels for the finished products. 
Development of tertiary industry is important for the improvement of the people's 
standard of living. Based on this viewpoint, we can expect much in the way of 
increased opportunities for investment in the service sector, that is, in commerce, 
physical distribution, and leisure, as the levels of income of the people rise and 
domestic demand increases. 
Nonetheless, the fast expanded scale of investment to fixed assets also incurs a tough 
problem looming over China's economic planners. In 1993, the over investment of 
fixed assets led to an exacerbation of the inflation in China. So the curbing of a too 
fast growth of capital construction will be a top priority task of macro-control in the 
mid and late 1990，s. At end-1993, the Chinese government instituted a two-level 
control on investments to fixed assets. One is a general screening to all the projects 
that have already been under construction to rearrange their priorities with the less 
yo ‘ 
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important ones to be delayed or suspended. The other is imposing a strict control on 
the ones to be started. Those projects which are short of funds will be prohibited 
from starting construction/^ Now, any proposed joint venture projects between 
State-owned enterprises and foreign firms should be subject to assets evaluation by 
authorized agencies and confirmed by State property administrative offices. 
Concerning the China's policy towards FDI, China will continue to welcome foreign 
investors, although the central government will be more discriminating in approving 
projects. It will increasingly be interested in the quality of investment. Some cities 
are likely to become similarly choosy: in particular, Shanghai, Guangzhou and even 
Shenzhen, which already seems to be favouring high-technology projects and service, 
will want to cast off their low-end assembly-plant image. Retailing will attract not 
only the large department store chains from Hong Kong and Japan; existing joint 
ventures manufacturing consumer goods in China are also likely to be attracted by the 
opportunity to open retail outlets there. Trading, distribution and insurance 
opportunities will similarly widen.^' Regarding the operating conditions, investors 
will encounter tough competition for virtually everything (raw materials, semi-
manufactures, transport, managers and workers) partly due to the improvement of 
state enterprises. 
49"Fast expanded fixed asset investment again raises an alarm," China Economic 
News, February 21, 1994, pp. 1-2. 
50China - EIU Global Forecasting Service 1st quarter 1993 (London: The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1993)，pp. 9-11. 
\ 
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9.2 PROSPECT OF JAPANESE COMPANIES IN CHINA 
More Japanese firms would establish or expand plants abroad in order to improve 
efficiency in manufacturing operations. The active markets of South-east Asia and 
China, which are still able to offer low labour and raw material costs, are expected 
to receive the bulk of the new outflows. As a result, the Asianization trend of 
Japanese FDI will continue. Investment in China would also speed up and strengthen. 
With the help of the Japanese government, small and medium-sized Japanese firms 
will continue to be the most active Japanese investors in China. In the last few years, 
Japanese firms have invested many export-oriented, medium-technology, light-
industry projects in China. Probably Japanese firms have stronger confidence in 
China's FDI environment. Or China is good for quality, low-cost products compared 
against ASEAN countries^^ for offshore sourcing. Or it is the only way out for 
Japan's recession and the yen's rise. According to the Japan-China Investment 
Promotion Organization, recent characteristics of the investment by Japanese 
companies in China include: 
(1) an expansion of the areas in which investment is being made. Recently, 
interest has been rising in South China regions such as the Shujiang river delta, 
Xiamen, and Fuzhou and inland regions such as Hebei, Hubei and Sichuan provinces. 
It is partly because of the growing difficulty in finding suitable land in the coastal 
regions and the rising personnel costs. As a result, investment is increasing in nearby 
5iThe Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 
in Bangkok to accelerate economic progress and increase the stability of the South 
East Asian region. The member countries are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
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areas. Taking Shanghai as an example, the adjacent Songjiang and Baoshan counties 
are rising as investment sites. 
(2) the range of industries in which investment is being made is expanding. There 
is an easing of restrictions in the wholesaling and retailing industries, warehousing, 
transportation, precision machinery, electrical and electronic equipment. 
(3) most of the investments continue to be of small and medium size, but large 
investments are also appearing particularly in home electric appliances and cement. 
For instance, recently, Uchiyama Advance Co. (a Japanese ready-mixed concrete 
producer), Yamaichi Kosan Co. (a Japanese ready-mixed concrete wholesaler, trading 
companies Itochu Corp. and Onoda Cement Co., Shenzhen Building Materials 
Industry Group Co. and Shenzhen Cement Tong Products Factory have initiated a 
US$3.5 million joint venture in Shenzhen to produce ready-mixed concrete for 
construction industry. The Japanese companies would hold a 51% stake; with 
Uchiyama and Yamaichi taking a 31% stake, and Itochu and Onoda each holding 
10%. The Chinese companies would hold the remaining 4 9 % ? 
(4) companies are switching to joint ventures so as to be able to tap into the sales 
channels of their Chinese partners in the China domestic market. 
52"Japanese Firms Mull Chinese Joint Venture," The Asian Wall Street Journal, 
April 4，1994，p. 3. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the Japanese investment in China. 
Currently, Japanese investment in China is growing rapidly, against the general three-
year decline in Japanese investment worldwide. Japanese firms are characterized by 
their aggressive high growth strategies. This draws our attention for their movement 
in China. Today, China is also Japan's second largest trade partner while Japan is 
China's largest trade partner. This is partly fuelled by investment activities. 
China's economic environment is the crucial factor for the development of its FDI. 
Since the start of the "open door" policy, China's economic growth has been well 
above that for the developed countries. The increase in domestic demand also attracts 
a lot of foreign investors. Political stability, openness of policies, economic 
development, trade balance, foreign currency reserve, investment environment, law 
and legislation, infrastructure are all key factors which determine the future trends of 
FDI in China. Investments in infrastructure, raw materials and tertiary industry are 
expected to grow. However, the overheated economy would still be the major 
problem in China. Due to the geographical proximity, Hong Kong investment in 
Guangdong and Japanese investment in Dalian would continue to grow. Meanwhile, 
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the inland cities, particularly those along the Changjiang River, would become more 
significant. 
Nonetheless, investment in China is a matter of weighing the benefits and costs 
associated with conducting business there in the short and long terms. Often, 
business opportunities are actually good in China, but difficulties in administrative 
procedures and the operating environment, which translate into high costs, kill the 
deals. Up to now, China's comparative advantages are still surplus labour and huge 
consumer market which can sustain high growth. However, the Chinese authorities 
usually emphasize the desirability of attracting FDI that brings in high technology, 
increases exports and develops infrastructure. Their policy statements do not fiilly 
take China's present comparative advantages. In other words, the policy may be 
running ahead too fast and incompatible to the actual situation. To most multinational 
corporations (MNCs), China is an attractive location for investment in the long run. 
Many MNCs are willing to invest a minimum amoilnt in the country just to maintain 
a foothold there. They do not care about the risk. For small and medium-size firms, 
they do not have the MNCs staying power. These investors may find opportunities 
in low technology and labour-intensive export processing activities. 
The Chinese government policies also change rapidly. At one time, investment is 
highly encouraged. At the other time, the economy is overheated and austerity 
program is launched. These frequent fluctuations have not contributed positively to 
China's image as a place to invest. For Chinese authorities, the key question has 
been how to fit FDI's market-oriented activities into China's essentially centrally 
Japanese Investment in the PRC 83 
planned domestic economy. FDI, as an integral part of China's overall drive for 
development and reform, has presented a challenge that authorities can meet only with 
a full commitment to fundamental changes in China's economic and social systems. 
Without major political or economic fluctuations in China, we believe Japanese FDI 
in China will continue to grow beyond the U.S. FDI in the near future. Japanese 
firms have not started their investments in China until the late 1980s. With the high 
J 
growth rate in the 1990s, the cumulative investment figures are sure to be surging. 
The question is whether the inexpensive labour force and the 1.2 billion population 
in the PRC are sufficient to induce Japanese firms in the late 1990's. Japanese firms 
are now targeting more on the Chinese domestic market. Should such strategy toward 
less export orientation and more import substitution be enhanced? Given the Chinese 
government policy, should Japanese firms neglect the present Chinese comparative 
advantages and carve themselves to a high-technology, high value-added FDI niche, 
leaving to other Asian countries the medium-level t6chnology projects? The answers 
for all these questions will be proved to be correct or not as time goes by. 
Nevertheless, this report is only an exploratory research. It is worthwhile to 
contribute more effort for further research to find out the answers. 
QA 
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APPENDIX 1 
PRIORITY INVESTMENT AREAS IN CHINA 
China has set up several types of investment area over the past 15 years in chronological order as 
follows: 
(1) Fujian, Guangdong provinces (1979-80) . 
According to the modernization programme, these two provinces have been chosen to grant special 
rights and privileges in conducting foreign trade and investment. 
(2) Special Economic Zones [SEZs] (early 1980s) 
Shantou Shenzhen, Zhuhai ad Xiamen in the southern part of China together formed the Special 
Economic Zones. The sones are designed to attract foreign capital, technology and expertise, 
offering in exchange tax incentives, a tariff-free environment and low charge for land and labour. 
In 1988，Hainan Island also received approval to become the fifth Special Economic Zone. 
(3) 14 Open Coastal Cities (April 1984) 
The 14 cities from north to south are: Qinhuangdao, Dalian, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao’ Lianyimgang, 
Nantong Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Beihai and Zhanjiang. Special areas 
in the 14 cities have been designated as Economic and Technological Development Zones with the 
aim of concentrating funds on importing advanced technology, and establishing ventures with foreign 
enterprises and joint research institutes to develop new technology and high-grade consumer 
products. 
(4) Open Economic Zones (mid-1980s) 
The five areas are: Liaodong Peninsula, Shangdong Peninsula, Changjiang (Yangtze) River Delta, 
Minnan Delta, and Zhujiang (Pearl River) Delta. All these zones encompass prosperous rural areas 
which surround major coastal cities. 
(5) Shanghai Pudong district (early 1990) . ^ ^ . .. d . 
The plan to set up this district is intended to benefit both Shanghai and the entire Chang]iang River 
Delta region, thus closing the gap in development between the inland and coastal regions. 
(6) Inland Cities (mid-1990s) , • ^ ， 
The region stretches from Pudong, known as the "dragon head", to Chongqing on the dragon s 
tail “ Altogether 28 cities and 8 prefectures have been designated "open", meaning they are on the 
Priority list for foreign investment. Major cities include Pudong, Hangzhou, Nantong, Nanjing 
Tongling, Wuhan, Jiujiang, Yueyang, Yichan, Chendu and Chongqing; Other cities m the north 
region such as Shenfu and Huanghua and in the southwest region such as Kuming, Nanning, 
Chuxiong, Yuxi, Daxian, Neijiang, Jiangyou and Leshan are also developed. 
Source: W.K. Anthony Wong et al，A Profile of The People's Republic of China, March 1993，p. g 
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APPENDIX 3 
RULES FOR SETTING UP A JOINT VENTURE IN CHINA 
Rules for the setting up of a joint venture business in China: 
Guarantee offered to the investor: 
Chinese government guarantee that she does not practise nationalization and 
expropriation of a joint venture unless under special circumstances for the interest of 
social public (Article 2). 
Investment needed for setting up joint venture: 
The proportion of the investment contributed by the foreign joint venturer(s) shall 
generally not be less than 25% of the capital of a joint venture (Article 4). The 
investment can be made in the form of cash, property rights, technology, equipment 
of the right to use of a site, etc (Article 5). 
Period for joint venture: 
The contract period of a joint venture may be decided differently according to its 
particular line of business and circumstance (Article 12). 
Termination of business: 
In case of heavy losses, the contract may be terminated through consultation and 
agreement by the parties to the venture and subject to approval by the approval 
authorities and to registration with the state competent authorities of administration 
for industry and commerce (Article 13). 
Management structure: 
A joint venture shall have a board of directors which is empowered to decide all 
major problems of the venture (Article 6). It is required that if the chairman of the 
directors board come from one joint venturer (e.g. foreign venturer), the vice-
chairman should come from the other venturer (i.e. the Chinese venturer. The 
employment of (deputy) general manager and other management like (deputy) chief 
engineer,, (deputy) treasurer and auditor will be done by the board. 
Source: W.K. Anthony Wong et al, A Profile of The People's Republic of 
China, March 1993, pp. 15-16. 
\ 
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APPENDIX 4 
CHINA'S NEW TAXES 
Here's a summary of the new taxes that took effect in China Jan. 1，1994. They 
apply to both foreigners and Chinese. 
VALUE-ADDED TAX 
Replaces the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax. Assessed on the 
production and the sale of products at each stage of manufacture. The rate is 
17% for most products, 13% for food and agricultural products, and 6% for 
small-scale businesses. Products for export are exempt, as are capital inputs 
for agricultural production, birth-control products, imports for scientific 
research, special imports for the handicapped and imports for diplomats. 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
A unified 33% tax rate levied on all companies. Lower, preferential tax rates 
on foreign firms in special investment zones will remain intact. 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
Levied on wages, salaries, revenues from individual businesses, contracts, 
rentals, royalties, interest, dividends and property transfers. The first 800 
yuan (US$92) of monthly earnings are deductible. Rates progressively increase 
to 45% for monthly incomes exceeding 100,000 yuan (US$1,150). 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX 
Levied on profits from stock transactions and the sale and development of real 
estate. Residential property developers who earn less than 20% profit are 
exempt. Acquisition, development and construction costs are deductible. 
CONSUMPTION TAX 
To be levied on luxury items including alcohol, tobacco and cars, at varied 
rates up to 45 %. 
BUSINESS TAX 
Assessed on service industries. Ranges from 3% on transport, construction 
and communications to 20% on bars, dance halls, teahouses, golf courses and 
other entertainment. . 
Source: Laurence Zuckerman, "China's New Taxes Puzzle Foreigners," The 
Asian Wall Street Journal, January 3，1994, p. 4. 
\ 
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